




Piercing the Corporate Veil: Where is the Reverse Gear?* 
Abstract 
This article examines the absence of an express distinction between forward veil-piercing and 
backward veil-piercing in English company law and argues that the Supreme Court missed 
the opportunity to develop the distinction in the case of Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 
[2013]. The underlying theme of the article is that the absence of an express distinction has 
contributed to criticisms on the law in this area, many of which were echoed by the Supreme 
Court in the Prest case. The article contains a brief analysis of US law on the subject to 
demonstrate that while English law does not expressly recognise the distinction between 
these two types of piercing, the distinction is well developed in the USA. The article also 
contains a brief examination of piercing the veil in tort cases and piercing the veil in contract 
cases and reveals a similar trend whereby the distinction is expressly recognised in US law 
and literature on the subject but not in Britain.  
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When a case goes to the Supreme Court, it is an opportunity for the Court to provide clarity 
in the relevant area of law. This opportunity arose in the relatively recent case of Prest v 
Petrodel Resources Ltd1 in which the Supreme Court reviewed the law relating to piercing 
the corporate veil. In so doing, the Supreme Court echoed the numerous criticisms made by 
academic writers and the judiciary about the rule to the effect that the law was in a confused 
and unsatisfactory state.2 It has been argued elsewhere that there is a consensus that overall, 
the Supreme Court clarified many facets of the law in that case.3 However, it will be argued 
in this article that although the Court engaged in an extensive review of the authorities and 
certainly clarified the law in many areas relating to the rule, the Court missed the opportunity 
to develop the law in one significant area of the rule. In that case, Mrs Prest sought the 
transfer of seven properties belonging to companies in the Petrodel group in order to satisfy a 
divorce settlement, claiming that in reality the properties belonged to her husband. The 
companies were wholly owned and controlled by her husband. The Supreme Court refused to 
pierce the corporate veil, but allowed her appeal on equitable grounds, holding that the 
properties were acquired and held by the respondent companies on trust for her husband.  
While the case undoubtedly raises many issues that are ancillary to the central issue of 
when a court can lift the corporate veil to satisfy a divorce settlement, the focus of this article 
is on the distinction between ‘forward piercing’ and ‘reverse piercing’. The leitmotif of the 
article is that there is a distinction between the two ways of piercing the corporate veil which 
has not been developed in English company law. It will be seen that the Supreme Court 
recognised this distinction in the Prest case but did not seize the opportunity to develop it. 
The article will make a brief comparative analysis of US law which recognizes a distinction 
between forward piercing and backward piercing. While the focus is on the distinction 
between forward piercing and backward piercing, the article also contains a brief examination 
of veil-piercing in contract law and veil-piercing in tort which is another area in the veil-
                                                          
*Dr Edwin C. Mujih, Senior Lecturer in Law, London Metropolitan University, UK. I am grateful to my colleague, 
Mr Barrie Goldstone, for his comments on the draft of this article. However, all errors are mine. 
1 [2013] UKSC 34; [2013] 2 A.C. 415. 
2 For a review of the criticisms about the rule see; E.C. Mujih, “Piercing the Corporate Veil as a Remedy of Last 
Resort after Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd: Inching towards Abolition?” (2016) 37(2) Company Lawyer 39. 
3 E.C. Mujih, “Piercing the Corporate Veil as a Remedy of Last Resort after Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd: 
Inching towards Abolition?” (2016) 37(2) Company Lawyer 39. 
3 
 
piercing doctrine where English law has developed differently from US law in that as in 
forward piercing and backward piercing, English law does not distinguish between veil-
piercing in contract and veil-piercing in tort, whereas such a distinction exists in US law and 
literature.  
  
The Distinction Between Forward Piercing and Reverse Piercing 
The doctrine of corporate personality protects the members of the company from acts done by 
the company. However, when the court pierces the veil, it holds a member personally liable 
for a corporate obligation. This is the normal operation of the veil-piercing rule and is 
referred to in this article as “forward piercing” or “standard piercing”. On the contrary, the 
court may sometimes be invited to pierce the veil in order to make the company liable for an 
obligation of a controlling shareholder. This is referred to as “reverse piercing” or “backward 
piercing” and describes the situation in Prest, since the appellant wife was seeking to hold the 
companies liable for her estranged husband’s obligations.4  
 Prest is not the first reverse piercing case. But it is unique in the sense that it was the 
first case in which the Supreme Court expressly recognised the distinction between seeking a 
remedy against someone other than the company in respect of a liability which would 
otherwise be that of the company alone (forward piercing) and seeking “to convert the 
personal liability of the owner or controller into a liability of the company”5 (reverse 
piercing). However, the court did not use the terms “forward piercing” and “reverse” or 




                                                          
4 It should however, be noted that the concept of reverse piercing has been described differently as a specific 
situation in which a company is willing to pierce its own veil. In a recent article, Jeff Chan argues that the main 
difference between forward piercing and reverse piercing is the identity of the party seeking to pierce the veil. 
From this perspective, he argues (in contrast to the position taken in this article) that English courts should 
reject the doctrine of reverse piercing particularly when it is the company itself that is seeking to pierce the 
corporate veil for its own financial benefits. J. Chan; “Should ‘Reverse piercing’ of the Corporate Veil be 
introduced into English Law?” (2014) 35(6) Company Lawyer 163 at 163. 
5 [2013] 2 A.C. 415, at [92], per Lady Hale. 
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Reverse Piercing in Early Cases 
The courts have impliedly recognised this distinction in earlier cases, although in a different 
context. In Gencor ACP v Dalby6, Mr Dalby (a director of the ACP group of companies) 
dishonestly diverted assets and opportunities into his nominee company in the British Virgin 
Islands. Rimer J held that the company was required to disgorge the benefits. Similarly, in 
Trustor AB v Smallbone (No. 2)7 the defendant managing director of Trustor AB transferred 
money to a company which he owned and controlled. The court held that although there was 
no breach of fiduciary duty by the defendant, there was sufficient evidence to lift the 
corporate veil on the basis that the company was a mere façade. It is clear that the cases of 
Gencor and Trustor involve the court piercing the corporate veil in order to impose the 
controller’s liability on the nominee companies, but these cases were not discussed in terms 
of forward piercing and reverse piercing.  
This can be illustrated further by the following two well-known cases. In Gilford 
Motor Co Ltd v Horne8, Mr Horne attempted to evade a contract in restraint of trade by 
forming a company to compete with his previous employer. The Court of Appeal held that 
the company was a stratagem to avoid the contract and granted an injunction against it in 
order to prevent competition with Gilford Motor Co Ltd, his previous employer. A similar 
device for avoiding a contract was used in the later case of Jones v Lipman.9 The defendant, 
Mr Lipman, agreed to sell a property to Mr Jones. However, he changed his mind before 
completion and then transferred the property to a company which he had formed for that 
purpose. The court found that the company was a sham and required specific performance by 
Mr Lipman and the company. The cases of Gilford and Jones show that English courts have 
dealt with cases in which the claimant seeks, in the reverse, to hold a company liable for the 
wrongful act of its controller. However, the problem is that these cases were never 
distinguished from standard veil-piercing cases in which the claimant seeks to hold the 
controlling shareholder liable for the acts of a company.  
 
 
                                                          
6 [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. 734 Ch.D. 
7 [2001] 3 All E.R. 987; [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1177 Ch.D. 
8 [1933] Ch. 935 C.A. 
9 [1962] 1 All E.R. 442; 1 W.L.R. 832 Ch.D. 
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The Piercing and Lifting Distinction 
Significantly, the distinction between forward piercing and backward piercing was implied in 
Staughton L.J.’s separation of the terms “piercing” and “lifting” the corporate veil in Atlas 
Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No 1)10 which was recently considered by the 
Supreme Court in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp and Others11. Staughton 
L.J. stated that piercing “is reserved for treating the rights and liabilities or activities of a 
company as the rights or liabilities or activities of its shareholders”, whereas “lifting … is to 
have regard to the shareholding in a company for some legal purpose.” Although Staughton 
L.J. did not expressly use the terms forward piercing and reverse piercing, it is clear that his 
description of the term “piercing” reflects forward piercing while his description of the term 
“lifting” reflects reverse piercing.12  
This distinction between piercing and lifting has a parallel with the distinction 
between concealment and evasion cases made by Lord Sumption in Prest. Making the 
distinction, Lord Sumption stated that the concealment principle “does not involve piercing 
the corporate veil at all … [while with], the evasion principle … the court may disregard the 
corporate veil”.13 He stated that lifting is permissible in concealment cases. It appears that 
reverse piercing (which, as argued above, reflects lifting by applying Staughton L.J.’s 
categorisation) is more aligned with the concealment principle identified by Lord Sumption, 
while standard piercing (piercing) is aligned with the evasion principle.14 The distinction 
could be expressed as:  
                                                          
10 [1991] 4 All E.R. 769, 779G. 
11 [2013] UKSC 5; [2013] 2 A.C. 337, at [118]. 
12 It is worth noting that in the VTB Capital Plc case, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury preferred to use the term 
“piercing” to “lifting”, although he refused to decide whether, in the context, there was any difference 
between the two terms [119]. 
13 [2013] 2 A.C. 415, at [28]. According to Lord Sumption, the courts will lift the veil in concealment cases and 
pierce it in evasion cases. What then is the difference between lifting and piercing? His Lordship stated that 
lifting, which is permissible in concealment cases, takes place when the court identifies the real actors behind 
an interposed company. On the other hand, piercing which is permissible in evasion cases, takes place when 
the court disregards the corporate veil in order to identify whether there is an evasion of rights or frustration 
of enforcement by the real actors. Hannigan argues that there seems to be little difference between the two, 
and that the distinction made by Lord Sumption between lifting and piercing and between evasion and 
concealment is difficult to apply consistently and objectively. Indeed, concealment is inherent in many evasion 
cases and the terms “lifting” and “piercing” are often used interchangeably. B. Hannigan, “Wedded to 
Solomon: Evasion, Concealment and Confusion on Piercing the Veil of the One-man Company” [2013] 50 Irish 
Jurist 11 at 30 and 34-35. 
14 For a discussion of the evasion-piercing versus concealment-lifting analysis in Prest, see B. Hannigan, 
“Wedded to Solomon: Evasion, Concealment and Confusion on Piercing the Veil of the One-man Company” 
[2013] 50 Irish Jurist 11. 
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a forward/evasion/piercing v backward/concealment/lifting distinction. 
In Prest, the Supreme Court stated that most cases in which the corporate veil was 
pierced (such as Gencor ACP Ltd, Gilford Motor and Jones) are not actually veil-piercing 
cases and that these cases could have been decided on other grounds.15 It appears from a 
perusal of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Prest that only the former categorisation (that is 
the forward/evasion/piercing classification) is recognised as real veil-piercing cases. In 
addition, most of the cases which are said not to involve veil-piercing fall within the latter 
categorisation. The Supreme Court’s review of Gilford, Jones and other cases in Prest reveals 
a reluctance to recognise concealment cases as veil-piercing cases. For example, Lord 
Sumption’s conclusion that the decisions to grant injunctions against Mr Horne in the Gilford 
case and against Mr Lipman in the Jones case were made on the concealment principle is 
connected to his overall conclusion that these were not veil-piercing cases. Lord Neuberger 
agreed with Lord Sumption’s view that cases concerned with concealment do not involve veil 
piercing at all and that the evasion principle is the only basis for the court might consider 
piercing the corporate veil16. The view that evasion is the only basis for piercing the corporate 
veil17 probably explains why their Lordships felt that the cases in which the corporate veil 
was pierced were not really veil-piercing cases. These were cases of veil-lifting, in which 
alternative remedies could have been sought. The Supreme Court’s observation in Prest that 
most of the cases18 in which the veil was pierced were not veil-piercing cases accords with 
Staughton L.J.’s description of the term “lifting”; however, the court was referring to 
alternative remedies in trust, agency and statutes. It appears from this analysis of judicial 
opinion that these cases were lifting or reverse piercing cases which should attract remedies 
outside company law. 
However, it has been argued that post-Prest cases are already showing a lack of 
clarity in Prest on the distinction between piercing and lifting the veil.19 Hannigan discusses 
the recent Court of Appeal case of R v Sale20 in which the issue was whether the corporate 
veil should be pierced or lifted in criminal proceedings. She observes that the refusal of the 
                                                          
15 [2013] 2 A.C. 415 at [27] and [64]. See also E.C. Mujih, “Piercing the Corporate Veil as a Remedy of Last 
Resort after Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd: Inching towards Abolition?” (2016) 37(2) Company Lawyer 39. 
16 [2013] 2 A.C. 415 at [61]. 
17 [2013] 2 A.C. 415, at [83] per Lord Neuberger. 
18 For example, Gilford, Jones, Trustor AB and Gencor ACP Ltd. 
19 B. Hannigan, “Wedded to Solomon: Evasion, Concealment and Confusion on Piercing the Veil of the One-
man Company” [2013] 50 Irish Jurist 11. 
20 [2013] EWCA Crim 1306; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 663. 
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Court of Appeal to pierce the veil, but its granting of an application to lift it reflects a mere 
change in terminology. She predicts that this distinction will experience a rise in applications 
to lift the veil and a drop in applications to pierce the veil.21 However, she discerns a 
distinction between lifting and piercing: piercing cases are concerned primarily with the 
enforcement of private law rights while lifting cases are concerned with the enforcement of 
public law rights.22  
The emphasis here is the absence of an express distinction between forward piercing 
and backward piercing despite the opportunities that have arisen for such a distinction to be 
made and the need for a distinction which might at least address some of the problems 
identified with the veil-piercing rule. Prest presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
develop this distinction. However, the court missed this opportunity, preferring to reject cases 
that happen to be reverse piercing cases on the ground that they are not veil piercing cases – a 
rejection which is occasioned by the absence of a distinction between the two types of 
piercing.  
 
A High Rate of Piercing in Reverse Piercing Cases 
This conspicuous absence of a distinction between the two types of piercing is a matter of 
some curiosity. A perusal of the cases reveals that the courts are more willing to pierce the 
veil in reverse piercing cases than in forward piercing cases, as seen in Gencor, Trustor, 
Gilford and Jones.23 These cases can be contrasted with the case of Yukong Line Ltd of Korea 
v Rendsburg Investments Corporation of Liberia & Others24, a forward piercing case in 
which Toulson J refused to pierce the corporate veil to make the controller of the company 
personally liable for the company’s debt. This certainly reflects the early version of the rule, 
where the courts firmly refused to pierce the veil in cases such as Salomon v Salomon and Co 
Ltd25, Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd26 and Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd27. It is 
argued below that the high rate of piercing in backward-piercing cases appears to confirm the 
                                                          
21 B. Hannigan, “Wedded to Solomon: Evasion, Concealment and Confusion on Piercing the Veil of the One-
man Company” [2013] 50 Irish Jurist 11 at 37. 
22 B. Hannigan, “Wedded to Solomon: Evasion, Concealment and Confusion on Piercing the Veil of the One-
man Company” [2013] 50 Irish Jurist 11 at 38. 
23 Although, as seen above, the Supreme Court has now held in Prest that those cases could have been decided 
on other grounds. 
24 [1998] 4 All E.R. 82; [1998] 1 W.L.R. 294. 
25 [1897] A.C. 22. 
26 [1925] A.C. 619; [1925] All E.R. Rep 51 
27 [1961] A.C. 12; [1960] 3 All E.R. 420. 
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observation by the Supreme Court in Prest that these are not veil-piercing cases. Hence, 
despite the companies being imputed the liability of the controlling shareholders, the 
principle in Salomon was still intact. On the other hand, forward piercing cases are real veil-
piercing cases which involve the courts upsetting the principle in Salomon and the low rate of 
piercing in such cases shows a reluctance by the courts to violate this fundamental principle.  
Either the high rate of piercing in reverse piercing cases is a coincidence or it is the 
natural outcome of a fundamental distinction between the two types of piercing. If the latter 
view is correct, then there is a need for this distinction between the two types of piercing to 
be expressly recognised, and a separate set of rules for reverse piercing might be considered. 
Indeed, the veil-piercing rule was developed on forward piercing grounds28 and applying 
such a rule to cases of a backward piercing nature without a prima facie recognition of the 
nature of such cases and distinction from forward piercing cases was always bound to be 
problematic. This may have contributed to the unsatisfactory and confused state of the law in 
this area - a criticism made by academics and judges. It appears to be the case that much of 
the sought-after clarity of the rule relies on this distinction being recognised. Lady Hale 
recognised this distinction in Prest when she observed, at [92], that concealment and evasion 
cases are all cases in which the claimant seeks to convert the company’s liability into the 
personal liability of its controller, unlike cases in which the conversion of the personal 
liability of the owner into a liability of the company is sought. Unfortunately, she did not 
elaborate on the distinction or provide further guidance on whether the same rule should 
apply in both cases beyond saying that in the latter case it is more appropriate to rely upon the 
concepts of agency and of directing mind. As the Sale case reveals, post-Prest developments 
already show the importance of such a distinction.  
Since a preponderance of English veil-piercing cases involve a claimant seeking to 
convert a company’s liability into the personal liability of the company’s controller, veil-
piercing rules have developed on this premise and have been applied indiscriminately to 
cases in which a claimant seeks to convert a company controller’s personal liability into the 
liability of the company. With the exception of Stone & Rolls v Moore Stephens,29 the 
Supreme Court (prior to Prest) had not had the opportunity to consider the converse situation 
in which a claimant seeks to convert the personal liability of a company’s controller into the 
                                                          
28 The rule was enunciated in the Salomon case, which was a standard or forward piercing case and applied 
rigidly in subsequent similar cases. It is worth reiterating that most of the cases where the veil has been 
pierced are reverse piercing cases. 
29 [2009] UKHL 39; [2009] 1. A.C. 1391. 
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liability of the company. Yet, in Prest, the court applied the veil-piercing rule without an 
analysis of the distinction between forward piercing and backward piercing. The 
appropriateness of deciding a backward piercing case such as Prest based on rules developed 
in forward piercing cases must be questioned. As the author of this article argues, this may 
have contributed to the problems damaging the rule which have attracted a barrage of 
criticisms from both academic writers and the judiciary. In Prest, Lord Neuberger observed 
as follows at [64]: “It is clear from cases and academic articles that the law relating to the 
doctrine is unsatisfactory and confused”. It has been suggested that, given the differences 
between forward veil-piercing and reverse veil-piercing, the latter case requires a different 
analytical framework from the more routine forward piercing cases.30 
 
Reverse Piercing Cases not really Veil-Piercing Cases 
It is clear that the best that can be said about cases such as Gilford Motor is that they are 
reverse piercing cases.31 In addition, perhaps the Supreme Court’s real intention in Prest was 
that reverse piercing cases such as these are not actually veil-piercing cases. The veil-piercing 
rule was developed in relation to forward piercing cases. As Lady Hale stated, in reverse 
piercing cases it is appropriate to rely on the concept of agency. The view that reverse 
piercing cases are not actually veil-piercing cases is tenable. This is because the claimant here 
seeks to enforce their claim against the company for the controlling shareholder’s a priori 
liability and no corporate veil is being pierced to make a shareholder liable. Rather, remedies 
may be sought in other areas of law such as agency and the law of trust since the liability 
arose outside of the company. In other words, the claimant is the personal creditor of the 
shareholder and seeks to make the company liable for the shareholder’s debt as in Prest. This 
                                                          
30 G.S., Crespi, “The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards” (1990) 16(3) J. Corp. L. 33 at 37. 
31 A major reason for the view that Gilford Motors (which was classified in Prest as a concealment case) does 
not involve veil-piercing is that the injunction was granted both against Mr Horne and his company. The 
argument is that it was not necessary to lift the veil for this purpose as the same result could have been 
achieved on the grounds of agency. This much is tenable. However, this view is restrictive as it looks at the 
outcome of the case only. It is submitted that in deciding whether or not a case is a veil-piercing case, one 
should not look at the outcome only. The court had to pierce the veil of the company, as a procedural matter, 
coupled with the fact that Mr Horne was also made liable. This procedural piercing of the veil and Mr Horne’s 
liability make the case a veil piercing case. It can thus be described as a case in which the court pierced the veil 
but also held the company liable, unless we are to say that it is the imposition of liability on the shareholder 
alone that determines whether or not a case is a veil-piercing case. If this were so, company law textbooks 
would have to be re-written to explain why the case and others have always been wrongly classified as veil-
piercing cases. What this problem highlights is the lacuna in English law on the distinction between forward 
piercing and backward piercing.  
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is unlike a forward piercing case in which the company is ostensibly the primary debtor and 
the claimant seeks to make the controlling shareholder personally liable. Here, the court 
would need to pierce the corporate veil in order to impute on the shareholder what is 
primarily the company’s liability. This is a real veil-piercing scenario determined by 
company law rules, as in the case of Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd.32 
Control and the use of the company for a legitimate purpose are crucial elements in 
such cases. In Ben Hashem v Al Shayif,33 Munby J examined a series of cases and observed 
that in Gilford, Jones, Gencor and Trustor in which the veil was pierced, the “wrongdoer 
controlled the company which he used as a façade or device to facilitate or cover up his own 
wrongdoing”.34 He stated that the cases are based on the anterior or independent wrongdoing 
of the controllers whereby the primary liability does not rest with the company, but a 
company is “used by its controller in an attempt to immunise himself from liability for some 
wrongdoing which existed entirely dehors the company”.35 Indeed, in his review of Jones in 
Prest, Lord Sumption stated that because Mr Lipman owned and controlled Alamed Ltd, he 
was in a position to perform his obligation to the plaintiff by exercising his powers over the 
company. “This did not involve piercing the corporate veil, but only identifying Mr Lipman 
as the man in control of the company.”36 The fact that the wrongdoing is independent and the 
primary liability does not lie with the company make these cases reverse piercing cases which 
fit the description of lifting or concealment. It follows that such cases are not determined by 
reference to company law rules and that the principle in Salomon is still intact despite the 
controlling shareholder being held liable. 
With the exception of Sale, the Court of Appeal has in recent post-Prest cases 
maintained the Salomon principle on the application of Prest in the context of confiscation 
proceedings. The first of these cases is R v Boyle Transport (Northern Ireland) Ltd.37 In that 
case, the second and third defendants who were the sole directors of a road haulage company 
were sentenced for conspiracy to make false instruments and a confiscation order was made 
against them. A new company (the first defendant) was later established with different 
directors. The assets of the old company were transferred to the new company. The judge 
                                                          
32 [1897] A.C. 22. 
33 [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam); [2009] 1 F.L.R. 115. 
34 [2009] 1 F.L.R. 115 [171]. 
35 [2009] 1 F.L.R. 115 at [199]. 
36 [2013] 2 A.C. 415 at [30]. 
37 [2016] EWCA Crim. 19; [2016] 4 W.L.R. 63. 
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extended the appointment of an enforcement receiver over the assets of the first defendant. 
The first defendant appealed against the judge’s decision and the second and third defendant 
applied for leave to appeal. 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and the applications applying Prest. The 
Court stated that where an issue of lifting the corporate veil was raised in criminal 
confiscation cases, Crown Courts were not to depart from the general principles which related 
to the separate legal status of a limited company. The Court of Appeal further stated that 
“where a company involved in relevant wrongdoing was solely owned and controlled by the 
defendant, it did not necessitate a conclusion, in a confiscation case, that it was an alter ego 
company, whose turnover and assets were to be equated with being property of the defendant 
himself.” The veil should not be lifted simply because the court thought that it was just to do 
so in a particular case [at 48 and 88]. 
In a statement that echoed its earlier warning to Family Courts in Prest, the Court of 
Appeal warned Crown Courts not to depart from established principles (of company law) 
relating to the separate legal status of a limited company in confiscation proceedings and held 
[at 85 and 89-92], that it is not justified to treat the assets of the old company as realisable 
property of the second and third defendants. The Court stated that sole ownership and control 
of a company is not sufficient of itself to justify treating the company as an alter ego of the 
defendant in a confiscation proceeding under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, at [119]. 
Boyle was applied more recently by the Court of Appeal in R v Powell (Jacqueline).38 
Like Boyle, Powell involves confiscation proceedings. Two company directors who were 
convicted of consenting or conniving in the company’s failure to comply with the condition 
of an environmental permit were held not to be personally liable under confiscation 
procedures for the cost of cleaning up the company’s polluted site. The Court of Appeal held 
applying Prest and Boyle that the company had been formed for a legitimate purpose and 
there had been no façade or concealment for hiding behind the company’s structure in a way 
which had abused the corporate shield. In relation to the evasion principle in Prest, the Court 
of Appeal found that the obligations to comply with the relevant environmental laws were 
those of the company and there was no legal right against the directors which existed 
independently of the company’s involvement39. The Court of Appeal rejected the Crown’s 
                                                          
38 [27 July 2016] EWCA Crim 1043. 
39 [2016] EWCA Crim 1043 at [20] and [29]. 
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submission that the respondent directors had an obligation to obey the criminal law 
irrespective of the company’s position and re-stated the rule in Prest which expressly limits 
the application of the evasion principle to rare cases.40  
Although the issue in Boyle was whether the trial judge had been right to pierce the 
veil of an old company in order to extend the appointment of an enforcement receiver to 
cover the assets of a new company for the unlawful acts of the applicants, it is unhelpful to 
attempt to classify the case as either a forward or reverse piercing case.41 Certainly, many 
cases involve elements of both categories.42 And, some cases probably involve neither. Boyle 
and Powell may come within the latter, as the companies in both cases were legally formed 
for a legitimate purpose.43 They were not formed to conceal the identity of the directors,44 
neither were they formed to evade a legal right of the respondent directors which existed 
independently of the company.45 As Treacy LJ said in Powell, “this was not a company being 
run for an unlawful purpose, but rather a legitimate businesses which had broken the criminal 
law through its failure to observe the necessary regulations.”46 
 Despite the aforementioned criticism of the application of the Prest distinction 
between lifting and piercing in Sale, a comparison of Sale with the later Court of Appeal 
decisions in Boyle and Powell shows that Prest has provided a measure of certainty in the 
law, severely restricting the circumstances under which the veil will be pierced. The decision 
in Sale was based on the facts of the case. Unlike Powell in which the court found that there 
was no concealment or evasion involved in the case since a legal right could not be identified 
against the respondents independently of the company’s involvement47, in Sale, the court 
found that the matter fell within the concealment principle identified in Prest. Unlike Powell 
and Boyle in which the respective companies had more than one shareholder48 and director, in 
                                                          
40 [2016] EWCA Crim 1043 at [30]. 
41 In Powell, the prosecution accepted that the case could not be brought within either the concealment or 
evasion principle, [23]. Thus, following the analysis in this article in which the concealment principle is equated 
with backward piercing and the evasion principle equated with forward piercing, the case cannot be classified 
as either a forward piercing or backward piercing case. 
42 Lord Sumption recognised this in Prest when he stated that “many cases will fall into both categories” [28]. 
43 [2016] EWCA Crim 1043 at [25] 
44 [2016] EWCA Crim 1043 at [27] 
45 [2016] EWCA Crim 1043 at [20], [28] and [29]. 
46 [2016] EWCA Crim 1043 at [27]. 
47 [2016] EWCA Crim at [29] and [30]. 
48 The company in Powell (Wormtech Ltd) had five shareholders, at [8]. The trial judge found that Mrs Powell 
exercised the majority of control of the company, but that this was exercised jointly to a limited extent with 
another shareholder, Mr Westwood. Treacy LJ observed that it was material that the respondents were not 
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Sale, Mr Sale was the sole shareholder and controller of the company. Besides his activities 
and those of his company were so interlinked as to be indivisible. Both were acting together 
in corruption, [40 – 41]. 
 
The Limited Liability and Corporate Personality Nexus 
The veil-piercing rule operates as an exception to the doctrine enunciated in the Salomon case 
that a company is a separate legal person once it is registered. It is often believed that a major 
corollary of the doctrine of separate legal personality is the concept of limited liability. 
However, it has been argued elsewhere49 that there are views to the contrary with some 
commentators arguing that limited liability is a concept which is distinct to that of separate 
legal personality; conceptually, historically and as a matter of company law statute.50 This 
lack of unanimity on the exact relationship between limited liability and separate legal 
personality obscures the effect of the veil-piercing rule on the doctrine of separate legal 
personality, which is a cornerstone principle of company law.51 If limited liability is a 
corollary of separate personality (as it is commonly thought), then every time the court 
pierces the veil, it is diluting this fundamental principle. However, if the two concepts are not 
interconnected,52 then the effect of piercing the corporate veil, if any, on corporate 
personality is unclear. 
The discussion of the relationship between limited liability and separate personality in 
the veil-piercing discourse is also relevant to the forward piercing and reverse piercing 
distinction. Such interrelationship features in a discussion by Kraakman and others of the 
different roles of legal personality and limited liability in the distribution of the assets of a 
company and those of its shareholders. In their discussion of the merits of limited liability, 
they argue that according to the principle, the company’s creditors are favoured over the 
individual creditors of investors and managers in the distribution of the company’s assets; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the sole shareholders of the company, [28]. Similarly, the company in Boyle (Boyle Transport (Northern 
Ireland) Ltd) had five shareholders, at [8]. 
49E.C. Mujih, “Piercing the Corporate Veil as a Remedy of Last Resort after Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd: 
Inching towards Abolition?” (2016) 37(2) Company Lawyer 39. 
50C.C., Nicholls, “Piercing the Corporate Veil and the “Pure Form” of the Corporation as Financial Innovation” 
[2008] 46 Can. Buss. L.J. 233 at 251 – 257. 
51 L. Sealy and S. Worthinton S., (2010) Sealy’s Cases and Materials in Company Law, 9th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 53. 
52 C.C., Nicholls, “Piercing the Corporate Veil and the “Pure Form” of the Corporation as Financial Innovation” 
[2008] 46 Can. Buss. L.J. 233. 
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while legal personality reserves shareholders’ individual assets exclusively for their personal 
creditors.53 It is submitted that veil-piercing upsets this equation by allowing a shareholder’s 
personal creditor to claim the corporate assets in the form of reverse piercing and allowing 
the company’s creditor to claim the shareholder’s personal assets in the form of forward 
piercing. As argued above, in forward piercing cases the company is the primary debtor and 
the claimant seeks to make the controlling shareholder liable. In reverse piercing cases, the 
shareholder is the primary debtor and the creditor seeks to make the company liable.  
Indeed, the above argument of Hansmann and Kraakman develops from their earlier 
work54 in which they postulated that the role of company law in protecting shareholder assets 
from creditors through the concept of limited liability is of secondary importance. They 
argued that the reverse of limited liability, that is protecting the assets of the organisation 
from the claims of the personal creditors of the owners, is the real essential aspect of asset 
partitioning. The crux of their argument is how organisational law facilitates the distribution 
of assets and redistribution of transaction cost. At the centre of their thesis is a separation 
between the firm’s bonding assets over which the company’s creditors have priority and the 
personal assets of the firm’s owners over which the owners’ personal creditors have priority. 
This separation is the defining element of a legal entity. Hansmann and Kraakman divide this 
distribution of assets into two categories: (1) “affirmative asset portioning”, which occurs 
when the company’s creditors take priority over the personal creditors of its owners in the 
distribution of the company’s assets. (2) “defensive asset partitioning”55 which occurs when 
the personal creditors of the company’s owners have priority over the company’s creditors in 
the distribution of the personal assets of the company’s owners. As observed by the authors, 
defensive asset partitioning is found in the “rule of limited liability that bars the corporation’s 
creditors from levying on the shareholders’ personal assets.”56   
Hansmann and Kraakman’s distinction between affirmative and defensive asset 
partitioning mirrors the forward piercing and backward piercing distinction in this article and 
underlines the above discussion of the relationship between corporate personality and limited 
                                                          
53 J. Armour, R.R. Kraakman and H. Hansmann, "What is Corporate Law?", in Kraakman R.R. et al. (eds), The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), p.6.  
54 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, "The Essential Role of Organizational Law" (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 387. 
55 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, "The Essential Role of Organizational Law" (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 387 at 393. 




liability.57 Both types of asset partitioning emphasise the concept of corporate personality and 
consequently limited liability. It follows that veil-piercing disturbs this rule. Their discourse 
emphasises a fundamental separation between the assets of the firm and the personal assets of 
the owners of the firm in a similar way to the forward and backward piercing distinction 
suggested in this article. However, the separation suggested by Hansmann and Kraakman is 
mainly in terms of priority. At the heart of their argument is a recognition of the concept of 
separate legal personality. What they take issue with is the role of “organisational law” and 
they see the firm as a nexus of contracts. The firm plays a coordinating role for the parties 
involved in the various contracts within the firm. It is implicit from their discussion that the 
company is separate from the owners, that the owners of the company have limited liability, 
and that the personal creditors of the owners have priority over the assets of the owners. 
Meanwhile the creditors of the company have priority over the assets of the company in the 
distribution of assets.  
However, if the limited liability and corporate personality nexus is not a prominent 
feature of Hansmann and Kraakman’s distinction between affirmative asset partitioning and 
defensive asset partitioning, the same cannot be said of their discussion of limited liability in 
tort. Before examining limited liability in tort, this article will briefly examine the forward 
piercing and backward piercing distinction in the US.  
 
A Comparative Analysis 
The forward piercing and reverse piercing distinction has been recognised and well-
developed by US courts. In the US, reverse piercing is further distinguished as either inside 
reverse piercing or outside reverse piercing.58 Inside reverse piercing is said to occur when a 
shareholder seeks to pierce the veil in order to recover debts owed by the owner or controller 
                                                          
57 There is an apparent difference in focus between Hansmann and Kraakman’s article and this article in that 
the former is priority-based. It focuses on the role of organisational law in the distribution of assets 
(specifically which of two groups of creditors has priority in the distribution of the firm’s assets and in the 
distribution of the personal assets of the firm’s owners). Meanwhile the latter is liability-based focusing on 
who is liable for whose misfeasance, that is, the liability of the controller for the company’s misfeasance 
(forward piercing) and the liability of the company for the controller’s misfeasance (backward piercing). 
Nonetheless, there are similarities between the two types of asset partitioning and the two types of veil-
piercing in the respective articles in terms of the relationship between corporate personality and limited 
liability.  
58 Although the distinction is recognised in the USA, Richardson has observed that both state and federal 
courts often apply the same analysis of traditional piercing to reverse piercing cases. M. Richardson, “The 
Helter Skelter Application of the Reverse Piercing Doctrine” (2010) 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1605, at 1606. 
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of the company from the company. Outside reverse piercing, on the other hand, occurs when 
a third party creditor seeks to recover the debts of the company controller from the 
company.59 Prest would be considered as an outside reverse piercing case since Mrs Prest did 
not own any shares in her husband’s companies. It has been observed that although several 
states in the US have rejected reverse piercing, there is a growing trend towards recognising it 
as a theory of recovery.60 One case frequently cited in the discussions about the development 
of reverse piercing in the US is Kingston Dry Dock Co. v Lake Champlain Transportation 
Co61 in which the Second Circuit rejected an application to attach the assets of a subsidiary 
company to satisfy the debts of the parent company, as the subsidiary had not sufficiently 
participated in the action giving rise to the debt to create liability. The court expressed doubts 
on the appropriateness of reverse piercing stating that it would be appropriate only in rare 
circumstances, if ever.62 However, reverse piercing was permitted in W.G. Platts, Inc. v 
Platts63 in which, as in Prest, the claimant sought to impose liability on her husband’s 
company in order to satisfy a divorce settlement. Unlike, Prest, the US court held that the 
company was the alter ego of the husband and permitted piercing in order to satisfy the 
decree nisi of the divorce.  
In a study on reverse piercing, Allen identifies two approaches used by US courts; the 
“inverse method of reverse piercing” and the “equitable results approach.”64 According to the 
inverse method, the court simply takes the requirements of traditional veil-piercing and 
applies them in the context of reverse pierce. Meanwhile, according to the equitable results 
approach, the courts imposes additional requirements to better protect the diverse interests 
                                                          
59 N.B. Allen, “Reverse Piercing of the Corporate veil: A Straightforward Path to Justice” (2011) 85 St. John’s 
Law Rev. 1147 at 1148 and 1163. See also: M. Richardson, “The Helter Skelter Application of the Reverse 
Piercing Doctrine” (2010) 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1605 at 1605 – 1606; and for a detailed analysis of the two types of 
reverse piercing claims, see G.S. Crespi, “The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards” (1990) 
16(3)  J. Corp. L. 33. For a discussion of reverse piercing by the owner of the company see M.J. Gaertner, 
“Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation Owners Have it both Ways?” [1989] 30 William & 
Mary L. Rev. 667. 
60 N.B. Allen, “Reverse Piercing of the Corporate veil: A Straightforward Path to Justice” [2011] 85 St. John’s 
Law Rev. 1147. 
61 31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929). 
62 N.B. Allen, “Reverse Piercing of the Corporate veil: A Straightforward Path to Justice” [2011] 85 St. John’s 
Law Rev. 1147 at 1154 and M. Richardson, “The Helter Skelter Application of the Reverse Piercing Doctrine” 
(2010) 79, U. Cin. L. Rev. 1605, at 1605 – 1606, at 1610. Richardson criticises the Kingston case above, for 
failing to clarify the distinction or similarities between reverse piercing cases and traditional veil piercing cases 
and how this affected the development of the law on reverse piercing cases in the US.  
63 298 P. 2d 1107 (Wash. 1956). 
64 N.B. Allen, “Reverse Piercing of the Corporate veil: A Straightforward Path to Justice” [2011] 85 St. John’s 
Law Rev. 1147 at 1157. 
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affected by reverse piercing.65 Additional requirements imposed under the equitable results 
approach include the question of whether reverse piercing would cause any injury to the 
company’s innocent shareholders and creditors. In Phillips v Englewood Post No. 322 
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S. Inc.66 the court found that no injury would be caused to 
the company’s creditors since they were identical to the controlling shareholder’s personal 
creditors. Similarly, reverse piercing did not injure innocent shareholders, since the defendant 
was the sole shareholder, as in Prest. 
  
Veil-piercing in Contract and in Tort Cases 
Another distinction which has not attracted much attention in the veil-piercing discourse in 
England is the distinction between veil-piercing in contract cases and in tort cases.67 
Although a preponderance of English veil-piercing cases are contract cases, the few tort cases 
that exist have had an enormous impact on the veil-piercing rule. The Adam v Cape 
Industries plc case is a case in which US employees of a wholly owned subsidiary sought to 
enforce a judgment in England against Cape, the parent English company. The Court of 
Appeal severely restricted the circumstances under which the veil may be lifted. Although the 
course of action was based on the law of tort, the case has been regarded as a blanket 
authority on the limits of the veil-piercing rule without any analysis made between veil-
piercing in tort and contract cases. 
The distinction is pronounced among academic commentators in the US and it has 
been invigorated by a debate on whether contract creditors (sometimes known as voluntary 
creditors) or tort creditors (sometimes known as involuntary creditors) are treated more 
kindly by the courts. Commentators argue not only that the courts should draw a distinction 
between the two types of claimants in evaluating veil-piercing claims, but that the case for 
lifting the veil in favour of tort creditors is more compelling than for contract creditors.68 The 
                                                          
65 N.B., Allen, “Reverse Piercing of the Corporate veil: A Straightforward Path to Justice” [2011] 85 St. John’s 
Law Rev. 1147. 
66 139 P.3d 639, at 641 (Colo. 2006). 
67 However, it is submitted that one difficulty with this classification is that some cases might not fit neatly into 
either category. An example is cases where the claimant is seeking to enforce a divorce settlement, as in Prest. 
68 F.A. Gevurtz, “Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil” [1997] 76 Oregon L. Rev. 853 at 858. See also M.J., Loewenstein, “Veil Piercing to Non-Owners: 
A Practical and Theoretical Inquiry” [2011] 41 Seton Hall L. Rev. 839 at 850 and 854; and D.H., Barber, “Piercing 
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basis for this view is that tort victims are involuntary creditors “who do not have an 
opportunity to bargain for the personal guarantees of … shareholders or other protections as 
many contract creditors would be able to do.”69 For example, in Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, Professors Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel postulate that veil-piercing is 
more appropriate in cases involving tort than in cases involving contract because voluntary 
creditors can protect themselves while involuntary creditors cannot.70 For example, in the 
case of a victim of a car accident or an employee who is injured as a result of exposure to 
dangerous working conditions, the victim or employee does not normally have the 
opportunity to demand the personal liability of the owners of the company prior to the 
accident. According to this view, contract creditors, on the other hand have the opportunity to 
do just that during their pre-contractual negotiations with the company, hence the courts 
should be less willing to lift the veil in favour of such creditors.71  
Despite the lucidity of this argument, studies have shown that US courts have a more 
liberal attitude towards piercing the veil in favour of contract claimants than in favour of tort 
claimants. In a study carried out on the subject, Professor Robert Thompson72 “surveyed 
every reported piercing decision through 1985 contained in the Westlaw database totalling 
around 1600 decisions.”73 The survey found that 40% of these cases were contract claims in 
which veil-piercing occurred and only about 30% were tort claims in which veil-piercing 
occurred.74 Presumably, the other 30% were in other areas of law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Corporate Veil”, [1981] 17 Williamette L. Rev. 371 at 380; R.B., Thompson, “Piercing the Veil: Is the 
Common Law the Problem?” [2005] 37 Connecticut L. Rev. 619 at 631. 
69 H. Gelb, "Limited Liability Policy and Veil Piercing" (2009) 9(2) Wyoming L. Rev. 551, 555, at 565; F.A. 
Gevurtz, “Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate 
Veil” [1997] 76 Oregon L. Rev. at 853, at 858 - 859. 
70 Easterbrook, F. and Fischel, D., Limited Liability and the Corporation, (1985) 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 112. See also, 
M.J., Loewenstein, “Veil Piercing to Non-Owners: A Practical and Theoretical Inquiry” [2011] 41 Seton Hall L. 
Rev. 839 at 850 and 854. 
71 S.M. Bainbridge, [2002] Corporation Law and Economics, 155 (Found Press). Cited in H. Gelb, "Limited 
Liability Policy and Veil Piercing" (2009) 9(2) Wyoming L. Rev. 551, 555, at 565. 
72 Thompson, R.B., “Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study” (1991) 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1036 at 1044. 
See also, Thompson, R.B. “Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the Problem?” (2005) 37 Connecticut L. Rev. 
619 at 631-632. 
73 F.A. Gevurtz, “Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil” [1997] 76 Oregon L. Rev. 853, at 859; Thompson, R.B., [1991] “Piercing the Corporate Veil: An 
Empirical Study” (1991) 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1036 at 1044. See also J.H. Matheson, “The Modern Law of 
Corporate Groups: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent Subsidiary Context” [2009] 
87 North Carolina L. Rev. 1091 at 1093 and M.J., Loewenstein, “Veil Piercing to Non-Owners: A Practical and 
Theoretical Inquiry” [2011] 41 Seton Hall L. Rev. 839 at 850, 854 and 857. 
74F.A. Gevurtz, “Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil” [1997] 76 Oregon L. Rev. 853 at 859. 
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The above discussion reveals a schism between theory and practice. While 
commentators favour a contract/tort distinction with a sympathetic approach towards tort 
claimants, Professor Thompson’s study revealed that US courts are indeed more sympathetic 
towards contract claimants than they are towards tort claimants in veil-piercing cases. In 
addition, it has been observed that the contract/tort distinction has received a mixed reception 
from the courts.75 The difference between the two has led to commentators observing that the 
distinction between veil-piercing in contract cases and in tort cases is more academic than 
judicial. Citing Robert Hamilton’s 1971 article in Texas Law Review, Professor Gevurtz 
comments that “long before Professor Thompson’s work, other writers had condemned the 
courts for not perceiving the need to distinguish between contract and tort claimant”.76 He 
observes that it is not the type of creditor who deserves piercing that is important, but rather 
the specific facts justifying piercing in favour of either type of creditor.77 Commenting on the 
tension in jurisprudential attitudes to veil-piercing, Professor Georgakopoulos similarly 
observes that academic opinion on veil-piercing is strongly in favour of piercing in tort but 
not in contract; in contrast, the courts do not favour piercing in tort and favour piercing in 
contract.78  
Perhaps the above observation understates the position in some academic circles in 
the US. Not only is the distinction between contract and tort a prevailing feature in academic 
commentaries on the subject with strong views ventilated against limited liability in tort, but 
some writers have gone as far as arguing in favour of abolishing limited liability for corporate 
tort and suggesting that limited liability should be viewed as a problem of tort law and not a 
problem of corporate law. They have argued that limited liability should be retained only as a 
basic rule for contractual creditors.79 For example, Hansmann and Kraakman argue against 
limited liability in tort80, preferring a regime of unlimited pro rata shareholder liability for 
                                                          
75 H. Gelb, "Limited Liability Policy and Veil Piercing" (2009) 9(2) Wyoming L. Rev. 551 at 566 citing S.M. 
Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics, Foundation Press, 2002 at 155.  
76 F.A. Gevurtz, “Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil” [1997] 76 Oregon L. Rev. 853 at 859. 
77 F.A. Gevurtz, “Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil” [1997] 76 Oregon L. Rev. 853. 
78 N.L. Georgakopoulos, “Contract-Centered Veil Piercing” [2007] 13 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 121 at 124. 
79 H. Hansmann, and R. Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Liability for Corporate Tort, (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 1879 at 
1881. 
80 They describe limited liability in tort as a “doctrine of very dubious efficiency.” H. Hansmann and R. 
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law. (2000) 110 Yale L.J. 387 at 431. 
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corporate tort.81 This would discourage the most severe forms of opportunistic cost 
externalisation.82 Limited shareholder liability for corporate tort, they posit, creates incentives 
for several forms of inefficient behaviours.83 Large business organisations use numerous 
strategies to exploit limited liability in order to evade damage claims.84 An unlimited 
shareholder liability regime for tort claimants would certainly lead to an increase in the 
number of claims. However, the question arises whether the popularity of the view that the 
veil should be pierced in tort cases is more a reflection of the fact that the US is a highly 
litigious society and views with suspicion any rule which is less favourable to the institution 
of claims.  
What can be said regarding the schism between the judicial approach and academic 
opinion on the contract and tort distinction in the US is that the court’s decisions are based on 
the facts of individual cases and not on any principle of law which favours lifting the veil in 
contract cases over tort cases. On the other hand, it is clear that the distinction has received 
wide attention among academic commentators in the US in a way which is yet to be seen in 
the UK. Such a distinction is warranted because of the differences between contract and tort. 
For example, the nature of the relationship between the parties in both types of cases is 
different and so is the aim of remedies. 
 
Conclusion 
It has been explained that the veil-piercing rule has been subject to intense criticisms. 
Nevertheless, the criticisms have not been examined in this article as this has been done in 
depth elsewhere.85 It is sufficient to note for present purposes that a common criticism of the 
rule is that it is arbitrary, unprincipled86 and notoriously incoherent and that its results are 
                                                          
81 H. Hansmann, and R. Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Liability for Corporate Tort, (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 1879 at 
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1881. 
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86 F.H. Easterbrook and D.H. Fischel, “Limited Liability and the Corporation” [1985] 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89 at 89, 
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unpredictable87. The Supreme Court echoed many of these criticisms in Prest and even 
considered abolishing the rule altogether. It had been hoped that Prest would provide an 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify the law on the subject. As explained at the 
beginning of this article, it is generally agreed that the Supreme Court did clarify the law in 
many areas of the rule, although some commentators believe (in the light of some post-Prest 
cases such as Sale) that the distinction between lifting and piercing may introduce a new level 
of confusion.88 Boyle and Powell show that the circumstances within which the courts will lift 
the veil are now very rare following Prest.  
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the lack of a clear distinction between 
forward piercing cases and backward piercing cases has contributed in no small way to the 
problems that have bedevilled the veil-piercing rule. As explained above, the rule was 
developed in the Salomon case (a forward piercing case). In addition, a perusal of case law 
reveals that subsequent cases in which the rule has been applied rigidly are largely forward 
piercing cases. Meanwhile, cases in which the veil was either pierced or in which the 
application of the rule was criticised by the Supreme Court in Prest are largely backward 
piercing cases. It follows that most of the problems arise from the application of the rule in 
the latter category of cases, which have led to different results. This had led to criticisms that 
veil-piercing is, among others, unjustifiable and unpredictable. The application of a rule 
which was developed in and perhaps for forward piercing cases to backward piercing cases 
was always bound to be problematic. The rule does not easily fit into backward piercing cases 
nor does it satisfy their peculiarity. For example, the application of the rule in a standard veil-
piercing case does not negatively affect the interest of the innocent shareholders in the 
company. On the other hand, they benefit from the controlling shareholder being held 
personally liable for abuse of corporate power. However, the application of the rule in a 
backward piercing case might adversely affect the interest of the innocent shareholders where 
the company is made liable for the private acts of the controller. 
A clear distinction between the two types of piercing examined in this article should 
help clarify the confusion surrounding the rule. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Prest highlights that the remedies sought for in the latter type of (that is, backward piercing) 
cases can be obtained outside of veil-piercing rules in areas as such the law of trust, equity 
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and contract.89 This is evident from the Supreme Court’s review of past cases such as Gilford, 
Lipman, Gencor and ACP. One need not look further than Prest itself (in which the Court 
applied this line of reasoning) to see the practicality of this statement. This was a backward 
piercing case in which the Court refused to pierce the veil and preferred to provide a remedy 
outside of company law (on equitable grounds). In so doing, their Lordships left the principle 
in Salomon intact, and at the same time, provided a remedy which achieved justice in the case 
at hand.  
Unfortunately, the Court did not make a clear distinction between these two types of 
veil-piercing. However, the distinction is implied and what can be deduced from the case is 
that forward piercing cases are subject to the principle in Salomon and the circumstances 
within which the rule can be applied are severely limited to cases in which “a person is under 
an existing legal obligation or liability … which he deliberately evades … by interposing a 
company under his control”.90 On the other hand, remedies in backward piercing cases such 
as Prest are best sought outside of the rule. It is worth emphasising that cases such as Gilford 
and Lipman are backward piercing cases because, as in Prest, the claimants were seeking a 
remedy against the company for wrongful acts committed by the defendants. The Supreme 
Court’s intention in Prest was that these remedies are obtainable outside the veil-piercing 
rule. In addition, one might venture to deduce that this implies that backward piercing cases 
are really not veil-piercing cases at all. However, cases in this category have been decided on 
veil-piercing rules with unpredictable results. A clear distinction between the two types of 
piercing might have alleviated the confusion and unpredictability of the law in this area. It is 
hoped that the distinction made by Lady Hale at [92] in Prest will provide an opportunity for 
the courts in future cases to develop the distinction between the two types of piercing and 
thus provide much needed clarity in the law.  
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89 As observed by Sealy and Worthington, statutory interventions to impose liability on defaulting directors do 
not ignore the company’s separate personality. The liability imposed is additional to that of the company. 
Sealy and Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), p. 
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